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CRIMINAL LAW
A recodification of the criminal laws of Indiana has been
provided for in Chapter 360 of the Acts of 1947. A commission of three members to be known as the State Penal and
Correctional Survey Commission is charged with making the
recodification and their report is to be filed with the Governor not later than November 15, 1948.
Bribery. The previous bribery2 statutes covered public
officers 3 and officers and employees of common carriers. 4
Chapter 17 of the Acts of 1947 provides, first, that those5
who give, or attempt to give, a bribe6 to any professional or
amateur 7 participant 8 in a sporting event, contest or exhibition commit a crime. The actor must intend that the person
to whom he gives or offers to give the bribe will corruptly
conduct himself 9 so as to influence the outcome of the sporting event. A previous statute requiring a similar criminal
intent was upheld as sufficiently definite. 10 The body of
case law accumulated under the existing statutes should, in
the most part, be applicable to the act under consideration.
1.

The last recodification of Indiana criminal law was in Ind. Acts
1905, c. 169.

2.

"The crime of bribery is a felony . . . and is one against public

justice. It has to do with a public officer and pertains to his
behavior in office." Williams v. State, 188 Ind. 283, 296, 123
N.E. 209, 213 (1919).
3. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1942) §10-601, §10-602, §10-603.
4. Id §10-604, §10-605.
5. "Any person, firm, corporation, partnership or organization, or
any agent or employee of any person, corporation, firm, partnership or organization . ...

" Ind. Acts 1947, c. 17. Other states

condense the list of those covered by stating "whoever,"
York Laws 1941, c. 753.

New

6.

"...any money, bribe or thing of value

7.

Some states do not distinguish between professional and amateurs.
Illinois makes a contest "where admission is charged" the criterion.
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 38, §83 a.

8.

".

.

..

I."
nd. Acts 1947, c. 17.

. contestant, coach, referee, umpire, or official ....

"

Ind. Acts

1947, c. 17.
9.

".

.

. shall corruptly or dishonestly umpire, manage, direct, referee,

supervise, judge, preside or officiate at, or participate in any sporting event .... " Ind. Acts 1947, c. 17.

11.

"The offense defined by the statute [Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl.
1942) §10-601] is clear and easily comprehended. If any person
holding an office of trust . . . solicits imoney . . . 'to influence him

with respect to his official duty, or to influence his action, vote,
opinion or judgement in any matter pending or that might legally
come before him' such person commits the offense . . . " Vehling

v. State, 210 Ind. 17, 19, 196 N. E. 107, 108 (1935).
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There is a "double standard" of punishment upon conviction. The act provides for imprisonment for not less than
one year nor more than five years. A fine of not less than
five hundred dollars nor more than two thousand dollars may
be added. There follows a provision for a fine in any sum
not exceeding one thousand dollars or for imprisonment in
the county jail for not more than six months, or both. The
latter provision is to be imposed at the discretion of the court
or jury. The first standard makes the crime a felony while
the second standard sets out punishment as for a misdemeanor."1 The court or jury trying the case has a wide discretion in fixing the actor's punishment. If they choose the first
"standard" *the actor must be imprisoned, to which penalty
may be added a fine. But if they choose the second he may
be fined without being subject to a prison or jail term. It
seems that the choice is left wholly to the court or jury trying the case, and they are given no criterion on which to
base a conviction under the first standard rather than the
second.
The second section of the Act covers the participant 12
of a sporting contest who receives, or attempts to receive a
bribe with the intention that he shall corruptly conduct himself13 so as to influence the result of the contest.

The "double standard" of punishment is again set forth.
The first consists of imprisonment for not less than one year
nor more than three years, to which may be added a fine of
not less than two hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars. At the discretion of the court or jury the second standard may be imposed. The second standard is a
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment in
the county jail for not more than six months, or both. A proviso1 ' makes it mandatory upon the court to adopt the second
11. "All crimes and public offenses which may be punished with
death or imprisonment in the state prison shall be denominated
felonies; all (and) all other offenses against the criminal law
shall be denominated misdemeanors." Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
Repl. 1942) §9-101.
12. "Any contestant, coach, referee, umpire, or official, professional
or amateur . . . " Ind. Acts 1947, c. 17.
13. ". . . or shall corruptly umpire, manage, direct, referee, supervise,
judge, preside, officiate or participate at any sporting event,
contest or exhibition . . . " Ind. Acts 1947, c. 17.
14. "Provided: That if any contestant . . . be an amateur and not a
professional he may be subjected to punishment, on conviction,

only as provided and within the limits last hereinbefore set forth.
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standard for the amateur contestant who receives or attempts
to receive a bribe. It is presumably optional as to the professional.
Dangerous Flying. Chapter 42 provides for punishment
of any person who operates 5 an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.
A person who operates an aircraft with reckless disregard
for the safety, property, or rights of others is also included
in the act. Before the passage of this act, flying so low as
to endanger persons on the surface and trick or acrobatic
flying over a thickly inhabited area were prohibited. 6 Chapter 42 of the Acts of 1947 reenacts those prohibitions.
Operating"7 an aircraft under the influence of intoxicating liquors, narcotics, or other habit-forming drugs is also
prohibited. Similar provisions are found in the existing motor
vehicles law.18 A pilot or passenger of an aircraft in flight
who drops anything which might create any hazard to persons or property violates the law and is subject to punishment under the act. A person convicted under this act is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be fined not more than
two hundred fifty dollars or imprisoned for not more than
six months, or both. It is also possible that a violation of
this statute might be considered negligence per se.21
Since "careless or reckless operation" of an aircraft is
the conduct necessary for a conviction, 'it is important to
determine the meaning of this word formula. Carelessness
connotes negligence. Negligent conduct"0 differs from reck-

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Ind. Acts 1947, c. 17. The word "may" is by implication converted
into "shall" by the words following it. i.e. "only as provided and
within the limits last hereinabove set forth. .. ." For a discussion
of the use of verbs in statutory drafting see, 2 Sutherland, "Statutory Construction" (3d ed. 1943) §4928.
Operating an aircraft on the ground or water, as well as in
the air, is included in the act.
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 14-109. The 1947 act amends this
section.
See n. 15 supra.
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 47-451, § 47-2001 are examples.
See Harper, "Law of Torts" (1st ed. 1933) § 78. Query if discharging cargo or parachuting in the case of emergency would be
a defense defeating recovery?
". ..
negligence implies inadvertance i.e., that the actor was completely unaware of the dangerousness of his behavior although it
was unreasonably increasing the risk of the occurrence of a proscribed harm." Hall, "General Principles of Criminal Law" (1947)
216.
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less conduct. 21 The question becomes: is the act punishing
negligence as well as recklessness, or is it using the words
"careless" and "reckless" as synonyms? If they are synonyms, which is to prevail? This becomes important in analysing the mens rea required. Since negligence implies merely inadvertance, a standard based on negligence negates a
criminal intent. To hold that a person who is not a "reasonably prudent man" is a criminal, nullifies one of the fundamental principles of criminal law. It is submitted that criminal liability should be based upon voluntary acts only. If
the legislature intends that negligence is to be the basis of
penal liability, that fact should be stated in unequivocal language. Criminal law is one field in which ambiguity should
not exist.
Trespass-Injury to Property. Chapter 161 provides
for the punishment of any person who, without the express
consent of the owner, wilfully, mischievously or maliciously
disfigures or destroys any geological formation found in any
cave. Upon conviction, the actor is to be fined not less than
fifty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to which
may be added imprisonment for not less than ten days, nor
more than six months. The new act is an expansion of the
22
present laws on malicious trespess.
Convict-Escape from Prison. Chapter 59 sets out the
punishment for prisoners who escape from the Indiana State
Prison, Indiana Reformatory or the Indiana Women's Prison; or those who escape from the custody of an officer conveying them to one of those penal institutions. The escapee
is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be sentenced
to the institution from which he escaped for not less than
one nor more than ten years. The sentence is to commence
immediately after the termination of the sentence he was
21. "Between the poles of intentionality and negligence lies recklessness. Recklessness is like the former in that the actor is conscious
of a forbidden harm, he realizes that his conduct increases the risk
of its occurrence . . . . But recklessness differs from intentionality

in that the actor does not seek to attain the harm; instead, he

belivs that th harm will not occur .... On the other hand, recklessness resembles negligence in that both include an unreasonable

increase in the risk of harm
doer is inadvertant thereto."

But, as noted, the negligent harmHall, "General Principles of Crim-

inal Law" (1947) 217. "Actually recklessness is no more a degree
of negligence than is intent. Awareness of increasing the danger

separates it completely from the genus of negligence."
22. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1942) § 10-4509.

Id. at 232.
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serving when he escaped. The punishment as set forth is
2 3
expected to present no constitutional difficulties.
24
The present law eliminates an ambiguity in the old law

as discovered in a case before the courts in 1943.25 It is now
provided that escaping from a prison to which the prisoner
was first committed includes: (1) Prisoners who escape while
in another institution for treatment after being transferred
from the first prison; (2) Prisoners who escape while in another county as a witness or litigent upon court warrant or
order, or for any other purpose; (3) Prisoners who escape
while working on a prison farm, or elsewhere under the
direct control and authority of the institution; (4) Prisoners
who escape while en route to or from the institution or while
away under any of the above circumstances.
When an officer conveys a prisoner to or from one of
the specified institutions, so much of the trip as is within
Indiana is to be considered as an entirety. An escape during
any part of the trip will be construed to be an escape from
the institution to which the prisoner had been committed.
Jurisdiction to try and punish the crime set forth in this
act is to be in any circuit, superior or criminal court, having
criminal jurisdiction, in the county in which the institution
is located. Since the legislature defines the crime of escape
to include escapes from other than inside the prison 2 6 walls,
the provision for laying venue probably does not violate the
Indiana Constitution.
Parole. Persons who have been released on parole from
the Indiana State Prison, Indiana Women's Prison or the
23.

The punishment for an escape was upheld where the punishment
was measured by the length of time for which such escaping
convict was originally sentenced, to commence at the expiration
of the original sentence. The court said, "It is for the legislature
to determine what the punishment shall be and in the creation of
a statute that bady is not held to narrow limits ..
" State v.

Rardon, 221 Ind. 154, 161, 46 N. E. (2d) 605, 608 (1943). The
provision under consideration by the court was Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, Repl. 1942) §10-1807. It is probably repealed by the
new act which contains a specific implied repealer.

24.

Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1942) § 10-1807.
State v. Rardon, 221 Ind. 154, 46 N. E. (2d) 605 (1943).

25.

The
court held that an inmate could be guilty of escaping from prison
when outside the prison walls. In that case the prisoners were
working on a prison farm when they escaped.

26.

Ind. Const., Art. I, § 13. See Workman v. State, 216 Ind. 68, 23
N.E. (2d) 419 (1940); Peats v. State, 213 Ind. 560, 12 N.E. (2d)
270 (1937). cf. Martin v. State, 176 Ind. 317, 95 N. E. 1001 (1911).
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Indiana Reformatory, and who commit another crime while
on that parole, are subject to consecutive sentences under the
provisions of Chapter 61. Upon conviction for the crime
committed while on parole, they shall be sentenced to one of
the named institutions; the second sentence to commence immediately after the first sentence has been served or annulled.
Procedure. As late as 1940 questions were being raised
concerning the taxing of fees by the justice of the peace in
favor of the prosecutor. 27 One act provided that in all cases
when the prosecutor or his deputy attends and there is a finding of guilty, a fee of five dollars should be taxed in favor
of the prosecutor. 28 Another act said that one of the prosecuting attorney's fees shall be a docket fee of five dollars
before a justice of the peace on a plea of guilty or on conviction.2 9 It was also provided that the prosecutor should appear in all cases in the courts of the justice of the peace when
the law so provided, and the fees as provided should be
charged and collected for the benefit of the general fund of
the county.30
Chapter 265 should help clarify these sections."1 It is
now provided that the justice or any city judge before whom
a defendant is brought must notify the prosecuting attorney
or his deputy of the proceeding if either is present within
the county or circuit.32 The prosecutor or his deputy must be
given an opportunity to be present if they are within the
county or circuit. It is also now provided that in all cases
where there is a plea of guilty, or a finding of guilty, a fee
of five dollars shall be taxed in favor of the prosecutor, for
the use of the county. It is submitted that under the new
27.

In construing Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1942) § 9-706 with
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §49-2511, the Attorney General
said ".

.

. it is the duty of the justice of peace to notify the prose-

cuting attorney of the proceding, whether the plea may be guilty
or not guilty, giving the prosecuting attorney a reasonable opportunity to be present. If he or his deputy does appear and defendant
pleads guilty or is convicted, a docket fee of $5.00 should be taxed.
no fee should
If he does not appear either in person or by 2deputy,
be taxed." Ops. Att'y Gen., Ind. (1940) p. 3 .
28. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1942) § 9-706.
29. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 49-2511.
30. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) § 49-2695.
31. Chapter 265, Acts of 1947 amends Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl.
1942) § 9-706. See n. 27 supra.
32. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1942) § 9-706 provided that the
wascircuit."
within
either "or
deputy
must be notified
prosecutor
his new
adds theif words
amendment
the county. or The
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law, if there is a plea of guilty or finding of guilty, it is not
necessary for the prosecuting attorney or his deputy to be
present in order to have the five dollar fee taxed in favor of
the prosecutor for the use of the county.
Disposition of Property Seized by Warrant. Chapter 188
34
is amendatory in character and changes the previous statute
by requiring immediate delivery to the sheriff of the county
by the justice of the peace, judge or officer having custody
of property or things seized under a warrant executed by
the seizure. Failure to deliver the property or things seized
to the sheriff is a misdemeanor and is punished by a fine in
any sum not exceeding five hundred dollars35
EMINENT DOMAIN
Chapter 39 provides that: (1) Municipalities or other
political subdivisions of adjoining states may acquire land
in Indiana for the purpose of operating airports or other
aerial navigation facilities; (2) Indiana municipalities and
political subdivisions are empowered to acquire land in adjoining states for such uses; (3) The municipalities and political subdivisions of adjoining states may cooperate with
those of Indiana in establishing and maintaining joint facilities. Section 2 of the act, granting a municipality or political
subdivision of an adjoining state the power of eminent domain in acquiring lands in Indiana, raises a serious constitutional question.' Whether the operation of Section 2 of
the instant act in fact affords a benefit to the people of Indiana determines the validity of the taking as a "public use"
within the meaning of accepted constitutional construction.
The exercise of eminent domain is an essential power of
2
sovereignty, and is limited, not conferred, by the constitution.
33.
34.
1.

2.

Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1942) § 9-604.
There seems to be a commendable policy for the change. Punishing public officers for failing to perform their duties efficiently
should help improve local administration.
Ind. Acts 1947, c. 39, §2. "Such municipality or other political
subdivision of an adjoining state shall have all the rights, privileges, and duties of like municipalities and political subdivisions
of this state, including the right to exercise the right of eminent
domain in accordance with the laws of this state as to property
not devoted to public use. . ." It is clear that the last phrase
must be read to mean "property not already devoted to public use,"
as public use is a definite limitation in Indiana. See note 4, infra.
Great Western Nat. Gas etc. Co. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557,
565, 66 N, E. 765, 768 (1903).

